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Abstract. The criterion—dependent choice model (Aschenbrenner, Albert & Schmalhofer, 1984) assumes that 
choice between two multidimensionally described alternatives is a sequential comparison process. The 
decision maker is assumed to select one dimension at a time and to compare the alternatives1 standings on 
this dimension according to attractiveness. The resulting value differences are accumulated over the 
processed dimensions until enough evidence is accumulated so that the decision maker is convinced that one 
alternative is better than the other. This study concentrates on the process of sequentially selecting 
dimensions and its relation to judgments of the dimensions' importance. In three experiments the dimensional 
selection process was observed by different process tracing techniques. Although subjects displayed 
considerable variability in their dimensional selection over repeated choice tasks, this process was well 
described probabilistically by Luce's choice axiom. Parameters of dimensional importance which were 
inferred from the subjects' sequences of processing information agreed well with independently elicited 
judgments of the dimensions' importance when the judgments were obtained by a magnitude estimation 
procedure. Importance judgments obtained by rating scales showed worse agreement. 
When choosing between two alternatives that are described by their features on a number 
of dimensions or attributes, people often do not consider all the available information about 
the alternatives; further, people appear to consider neither information on the same 
dimensions, nor even the same amount of information when choosing among different pairs 
of alternatives of the same kind, e.g., pairs of journal subscriptions (Schmalhofer, Albert, 
Aschenbrenner & Gertzen, 1986). 
We tried to model this phenomenon by means of the criterion —dependent choice (CDC) 
model (Aschenbrenner, Albert & Schmalhofer, 1984). For binary choices among 
multidimensionally described alternatives, this model assumes that: a) people process 
information about the alternatives sequentially; b) people compare the alternatives with 
respect to the subjective evaluations of the alternatives's features on one dimension at a 
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time; c) the results of these comparisons are accumulated over the processed dimensions; 
and d) this comparison stops and an alternative is chosen when a person has accumulated 
enough evidence to be convinced that one alternative is better, i.e., when the accumulated 
comparison results reach or exceed a critical value. 
In this paper a special aspect within this model framework is analyzed in more detail, 
namely, the process of selecting the dimensions on which the choice alternatives are 
compared. We will consider two questions: a) How can an individual's process of selecting 
dimensions be described? and b) Are there relations between this selection process and 
independently elicited judgments of the importance of the dimensions? 
As an example, Table 1 displays two subjects' sequences of processing dimensions when 
choosing between 15 pairs of journal subscriptions. Schmalhofer et al. (1986) showed that 
the resulting choices may be well described by the CDC —model when these selection 
sequences are known. Table 1 also demonstrates, however, that the subjects did not inspect 
the same dimensions for all choices. Rather, the inspected dimensions, their number, and 
their order vary from choice to choice. Furthermore, Table 1 displays some individual 
differences; for instance, the second subject appears to be much more variable than the 
first subject. Thus, under conditions where the sequence of inspected dimensions is not 
known, prediction of a subject's choices may fail even if an appropriate model is used and 
the subject's evaluations of the alternatives' features are known, simply because one does 
not know which dimensions are incorporated into the choice process. 
Since, as Table 1 demonstrates, the processed dimensions often cannot be predicted with 
certainty, we tried to model this selection process probabilistically. The assumption that 
will be tested in this paper is that the selection process may be described by Luce's (1959) 
choice axiom. Let J denote the set of dimensions that have not been processed, i.e., 
initially J is the set of all dimensions; during the choice process the considered dimensions 
are successively removed from J. Then the choice axiom states that a subject's probability, 
pjj, for choosing a dimension i from set J for comparing the alternatives is 
PiJ = s i / L S J , (1) 
where si are parameters of the dimensions which are independent of the respective set J. 
Additionally, we assume that s{ are some function of the dimensions' importance for the 
subject in the given choice situation. 
Although it has been shown repeatedly that the choice axiom usually does not hold for 
choices among multidimensional alternatives (Luce, 1977), there are reasons to consider it 
for the selection of dimensions, because dimensional importance is considered to be a 
one—dimensional continuum. Indeed, in an experiment where the subjects were presented 
with all information about pairs of alternatives simultaneously and no data about 
dimensional selection were collected, Aschenbrenner et al. (1984) obtained a reasonably 
good fit of subjects* choices for the CDC—model combined with Equation 1. In that study, 
it was additionally assumed that sj=exp(wj), where WJ was the importance that the subject 
independently assigned to dimension i using a 7—point rating scale. With this assumption, 
the CDC—model yielded better (probabilistic) predictions of the subjects* choices than the 
weighted additive model using all presented dimensions. 
Table 1: Two subjects' sequences of inspecting alternatives' features on up to 11 
dimensions when choosing between 15 pairs of journal subscriptions. The 
dimensions' names are given in Table 2 
Choice Sequence of inspected dimensions Choice 
pair Subject 154, Experiment I: 
1/6 i 4 5 6 
3/8 1 11 4 6 
1/2 11 1 4 6 8 9 
5/6 1 11 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1/8 1 11 4 6 
5/3 1 11 4 5 6 
8/2 1 11 4 7 8 9 
3/1 1 11 10 7 
8/6 1 11 4 6 7 9 
2/3 1 11 4 6 7 8 
5/8 1 11 4 6 7 
6/2 1 4 11 8 9 7 
5/1 1 4 11 9 7 6 
3/6 1 11 4 5 6 7 8 9 
2/5 1 4 6 7 
Subject 37, Experiment II with consequences: 
1/6 1 11 7 6 9 8 B 
3/8 1 5 7 6 9 B 
1/2 1 3 5 9 6 11 B 
5/6 11 1 3 5 7 6 9 8 B 
1/8 1 5 8 9 7 6 10 11 3 A 
5/3 4 3 10 11 1 9 8 A 
8/2 5 1 11 3 6 7 9 8 A 
3/1 8 1 3 B 
8/6 9 11 5 1 6 7 B 
2/3 6 1 5 11 A 
5/8 9 7 6 10 3 8 1 5 B 
6/2 1 11 5 3 8 A 
5/1 6 7 9 1 5 A 
3/6 9 6 5 1 7 8 11 8 
2/5 6 9 7 8 1 5 B 
Here, we will analyse data from three experiments in which the subjects' sequences of 
selecting dimensions were directly observed. It will be tested whether the observed 
selection data are compatible with the choice axiom. The choice axiom also allows us to 
estimate the assumed parameters sj from the selection data. These parameters will be 
compared with the subjects' explicit judgments of the dimensions' importance. 
The first two experiments were originally conducted for a different purpose (Schmalhofer 
et al., 1986) and are reanalyzed here. The third experiment was especially designed for the 
purpose of this paper. 
Experiments I and II (Reanalyses) 
The two experiments which are reanalyzed here were identical except for an additional 
experimental variable in the second experiment and some additional tasks that are not of 
interest here. They are described in more detail in Schmalhofer et al. (1986). 
In both experiments, the choice tasks consisted of choosing a one year subscription to a 
news magazine. Six descriptions of real journals were used as choice alternatives, each of 
which was described by its features on 11 dimensions. All possible pairs of alternatives 
were constructed, thus yielding a complete paired comparison with 15 choice pairs. An 
English translation of a sample choice pair is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: A sample choice pair as it would be seen by a subject who uncovered all 11 
dimensions. (The dimensions' numbers were not given in the display.) 
alternative 
No. Dimension A 6 
1 Frequency of publication monthly weekly 
2 No. of a r t i c l e s on science 4 1 
3 No. of advertisements 120 180 
4 Price of magazine 6.- DM*) 4.- DM*) 
5 No. of a r t i c l e s on p o l i t i c s 70 25 
6 No. of a r t i c l e s on ecology 1 5 
7 No. of a r t i c l e s on entertainment 5 3 
8 No. of a r t i c l e s on cu l tura l events 3 5 
9 No. of pictures 15 15 
10 No. of color pictures 10 3 
11 No. of pages in magazine 350 300 
*) DM: West German marks 
Subjects first evaluated the importance of the 11 dimensions on 7-point rating scales 
which ranged from 1 (unimportant) to 7 (very important). These ratings were collected in 
random order and interspersed with attractiveness ratings of the alternatives' features on the 
dimensions. 
Then the subjects were individually presented with the choice pairs on an information 
display board. While this display board always revealed the names of the dimensions by 
which the alternatives were described, the features of a choice pair had to be separately 
uncovered for every dimension. Thus, subjects had to successively request the alternatives' 
features on one of the dimensions until they wished to make a choice. At the beginning of 
every choice, subjects only saw the names of the 11 dimensions used to describe the 
alternatives. By opening a door on the display, the subject could then inspect a feature pair 
on a dimension which remained visible thereafter. After inspecting these features, the 
subject could request the features of another dimension. This procedure was repeated until 
a subject wanted to make a choice. Subjects were instructed to inspect as many feature 
pairs or dimensions as they liked before making a choice. The journals' names were not 
revealed to the subjects. The choices and the selected dimensions were recorded. Two 
sample protocols are shown in Table 1. 
Whereas all the choices were hypothetical in the first experiment, half of the subjects 
received a free copy of the journal they had chosen in a randomly selected pair in addition 
to their payment at the end of the second experiment. This was announced to the respective 
subjects before they made their choices. 
Subjects were students from the University of Heidelberg, who were paid 10 German 
marks per hour. Twenty—eight subjects participated in Experiment I; Experiment II had 21 
subjects without consequences and 21 subjects who additionally received a copy of a 
chosen journal as a consequence. 
Results 
Fitting the choice axiom. The s{ parameters of the dimensions were estimated individually 
from each subject's 15 orders of inspecting dimensions by an iterative maximum likelihood 
algorithm described by van Putten (1982). This algorithm allows us to estimate all sj 
values simultaneously according to Equation 1. This is accomplished by determining the 
subsets of dimensions that occur in a subject's processing orders, and by counting how 
often each dimension is chosen from each subset. The first subset of the first subject in 
Table 1 is, of course, the set of all dimensions which occurs as the first set in every 
choice problem, i.e., 15 times. From this set Dimension 1 was chosen 14 times, and 
Dimension 11 was chosen once. The next subset is the set of all dimensions except 
Dimension 1 which occurs 14 times. From this set there were ten choices of Dimension 11 
and four choices of Dimension 4. Next, the set without Dimensions 1 and 11 occurs 11 
times, and Dimension 4 was always chosen from this set, and so on. Two dimensions (2 
and 3) were never inspected. In toto, the selection sequences of Subject 154 yield 21 
different subsets from which 84 dimensional selections were observed. 
The frequencies of the subsets and the frequencies with which dimensions were chosen 
from the subsets provide the input values for van Putten's algorithm. The algorithm 
converged to the limits of the computer's accuracy within 10 to 200 iterations for most 
subjects. 
Most subjects (21 out of 28 in Experiment I, 16 out of 21 in both conditions of 
Experiment II) had some (1 to 8; 2.5 on average) dimensions which they never inspected. 
In these cases the respective dimensions received SJ —values of zero in advance — in 
accordance with the choice axiom. These dimensions were not considered for model fitting, 
nor were they considered in the subsequent likelihood ratio tests. 
Furthermore, about one third of the subjects (9 in Experiment I, 8 and 6 in Experiment II 
with and without consequences) had a few (1 to 3; 1.9 on average) dimensions which they 
always inspected first in a fixed order. These dimensions were also excluded from 
parameter estimation and testing. 
Both exclusions are conservative, since the choice axiom can perfectly account for these 
Cases by assigning zero parameters to neglected dimensions, and arbitrarily large — 
theoretically infinite — parameters to dimensions that are always chosen first. Thus, these 
exclusions decrease rather than increase model fit. 
A likelihood ratio for testing the choice axiom with the estimated parameters against the 
unrestricted model was calculated for each subject by the formulas supplied by van Putten 
(1982). These likelihood ratios were transformed into asymptotically distributed x^  (Chi — 
square) values (x^  = — 2*log(LR)) for testing model fit. Since the degrees of freedom for 
the test depend on the number and sizes of the subsets of dimensions of a subject which 
further depend on the subject's variability and on the number of processed dimensions, the 
degrees of freedom strongly vary between subjects. Therefore, as a summary statistic we 
report only the distribution of probabilities of x^  over subjects, that is, the probabilities of 
the observed selection orders under the assumption that the model holds. 
Table 3 displays some percentiles of the distributions of these probabilities for the two 
experiments. More specifically, Table 3 displays the median, the 3rd and 1st quartile, and 
the 95th and 5th percentile of the distributions of probabilities of x^  over subjects. If the 
choice axiom holds, one would expect the percentile values to be identical to their 
percentiles, i.e., the median should be at about .50, the 95th percentile value should be 
.95, etc. From Table 3 it is seen that the fit of the choice axiom to the selection data is 
even better than this. For instance, for 50% of the subjects in Experiment I p(x^ ) is 
greater than .998. 
Selecting Dimensions when Choosing 
Table 3: Selected percentiles of the distribution of p(x2) over subjects 
Exp. Conse- Percentile 
no. quences 95* 75% 50% 25% 5% 
Exp. I without 1.0 .99998 .99855 .81715 .354 
Exp. with 1.0 .99999 .99986 .97813 .140 
II without 1.0 .99999 .99965 .97605 .249 
together 1.0 .99999 .99986 .97605 .143 
Exp. with .99 .92 .70 .40 .015 
I l l without .98 .64 .31 .09 .022 
together .99 .88 .50 .19 .020 
Table 4: Frequencies of inspecting each dimension in each order position (upper entries) 
and frequencies predicted from the s{ values (lower entries) for the selection 
sequences in Table 1. (The table shows, for instance, that Subject 37 inspected 
Dimension 1 as the first dimension in five choice tasks, whereas the 
BTL—model would predict this for 4.42 choice tasks.) 
Subject 154: x2=*4.92, df=101, p=.998 
Dimen- Position in selection sequence 
sion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 si 
1 14 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 482.8026 
14.03 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 0 4 11 0 0 0 0 0 11.4479 
0.33 4.80 9.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0.1316 
0.00 0.06 0.14 1.41 1.14 1.26 0.00 0.00 
6 0 0 1 6 4 1 0 0 0.5360 
0.02 0.23 0.56 5.70 3.69 1.82 0.00 0.00 
7 0 0 0 2 5 3 0 0 0.3474 
0.01 0.15 0.36 3.71 3.81 1.96 0.00 0.00 
8 0 0 0 1 2 1 2 0 0.1545 
0.00 0.07 0.16 1.65 1.72 1.37 1.02 0.00 
9 0 0 0 1 1 3 0 2 0.1295 
0.00 0.05 0.14 1.38 1.45 1.36 0.86 1.76 
10 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.0178 
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.12 0.24 
11 1 10 3 0 0 0 0 0 20.7714 
0.60 8.67 3.76 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sum 15 15 15 15 12 80 2 2 
Table 4 is continued on the next page. 
Subject 37: x2=193.45, df=363, p=.999989 
Dimen- Position in selection sequence 
sion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 s i 
1 5 4 0 3 2 0 1 0 0 4.577 
4.42 3.30 2.24 2.63 1.32 0.51 0.57 0.00 0.00 
3 0 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 1 0.823 
0.80 0.97 1.06 1.07 1.07 1.04 0.69 0.39 0.92 
4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.071 
0.07 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.08 
5 1 ? 5 1 1 1 0 1 0 2.114 
2.04 2.33 2.35 1.28 1.34 1.46 0.58 0.62 0.00 
6 3 1 1 2 3 2 0 0 0 2.083 
2.01 1.99 2.25 2.19 2.14 1.10 0.32 0.00 0.00 
7 0 2 3 0 3 2 0 0 0 1.487 
1.43 1.75 1.91 1.56 1.84 1.28 0.23 0.00 0.00 
8 1 0 1 1 1 3 1 2 0 0.937 
0.91 1.04 1.26 1.39 1.60 1.59 0.73 1.49 0.00 
9 3 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 0 1.952 
1.89 1.87 2.17 2.15 1.70 1.01 1.22 0.00 0.00 
10 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0.252 
0.24 0.30 0.37 0.39 0.46 0.48 0.37 0.40 0.00 
11 1 3 1 2 0 1 1 1 0 1.232 
1.19 1.37 1.31 1.25 1.39 1.37 1.19 0.94 0.00 
Sum 15 15 15 14 13 10 6 4 1 
This extreme fit is observed for both experiments with hardly any differences between 
them nor between the two conditions of Experiment II. There is only one subject 
(Experiment II with consequences) for whom the choice axiom was clearly violated (x^ = 
181, df=96, p=0.0). Some of the selection sequences of this subject were cyclic 
permutations of others. This subject thus demonstrates that the choice axiom is not trivially 
fullfilled for the kind of task used here. Thus, we can conclude that the choice axiom can 
very well explain the subjects* sequences of inspecting dimensions. Table 4 gives a more 
intuitive demonstration of the fit by showing for the data from Table 1 how often each 
dimension was inspected in each rank position and how often these positions were 
predicted by the choice axiom. 
We also calculated the likelihood ratio for the estimated si —values as compared to the 
choice axiom assuming the SJ — values are equal for all dimensions. For all but three 
subjects, equal parameters explained the data significantly (p<.01) worse than the 
estimated parameters. On average the observed selection sequences were 5* 10^3 more 
likely under the estimated parameters than under equal s^-values. This demonstrates that 
the estimated parameters are meaningful; the choice axiom is not trivially fulfilled with any 
parameters. 
Despite the size of the fit, however, the absolute values of the likelihood ratio tests should 
be considered with care, because many of the expected frequencies of selecting dimensions 
from subsets that were entered into the tests were close to zero. In order to meet the usual 
criterion that all expected frequencies should be at least 5, we would have needed about 50 
times as many selection sequences per subject. Thus, the goodness of the x 2 
approximation appears questionable here. This problem is addressed in Experiment III 
which used a pair comparison method in order to get higher expected frequencies. 
Importance judgements. The second question of interest is whether the subjects' sequences 
of selecting dimensions have any relation to their judgments of the dimensions' importance 
that were independently elicited. According to Aschenbrenner et al.'s (1984) assumption, 
the logarithms of the sj —values were correlated with the importance ratings of the 
dimensions, W J , individually for each subject. In order to get sj-values for all dimensions 
including those that were neglected or inspected in a fixed order, the estimation procedure 
was slightly modified by adding a small fraction (1/11) to all dimensions' absolute choice 
frequencies of the respective subjects. This is a commonly used procedure which does not 
change the order of parameters but which yields finite ratios of parameters for all pairs of 
dimensions. 
Table 5 displays the distributions of the resulting product-moment-correlations^ 
between log(si)— and W J — values over subjects. Although most of the correlations are 
positive, showing at least some relation between judged importance and dimensional 
selection, it is also obvious that this relation is not overwhelmingly strong. This is also 
demonstrated in Figure 1 which graphically displays the relation for the "best" and an 
average subject from Experiment I. In general, the correlations appear to be too low to 
reliably predict dimensional selection from judged importance. 
Table 5: Minimum, maximum, and quartiles of the distribution of correlations between 
si and wi over subjects 
Exp. conse-
no. quences Max. 3.Qu. Median l . Q u . Min. 
Exp. I without .86 .64 .52 .26 -.31 
Exp. with .91 .65 .41 .22 -.26 
II without .91 .41 .17 .04 -.19 
Exp. with .99 .97 .68 .78 .32 
I l l without .99 .96 .94 .88 .69 
2) Rank order correlations were also calculated. They were generally somewhat lower (by .05 to .10) but 
otherwise showed the same pattern of results. 
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Figure 1: Plots of the relation between log(si) and judged importance, W J , for the "best** 
and an average subject in Experiment 1 
Experiment HI 
Since we suspected that low expected frequencies may be partly responsible for the 
superficially good fit of the choice axiom in the reanalyses, a new experiment was 
especially designed to directly collect selection data between pairs of dimensions. Further, 
another method for eliciting importance judgments, namely the method of magnitude 
estimation, was applied. 
Method 
Subjects. Subjects were 40 students of the University of Heidelberg who responded to a 
notice in the cafeteria asking for volunteers who liked to play board games. 
Design and procedure. Choice alternatives were board games which had been newly 
published in 1984, so that not many subjects could be expected to know or have the 
games. The games were described on 13 dimensions, such as required skills, number of 
participants, chance/strategy ratio, etc. In order to keep the time for the experiment within 
reasonable limits and to avoid dimensions that were totally irrelevant to a subject, each 
subject chose his/her eight most important dimensions from a list of all 13 dimensions at 
the beginning of the experiment. Only these eight dimensions were used for the respective 
subject. 
The main part of the experiment was run under the control of an apple II computer. The 
computer selected a pair of games and then offered the subjects a pair of dimension names. 
The subjects had to select one dimension on which they were informed about the 
alternatives' features. Then the subjects were allowed to choose between the two games on 
the basis of this information or to ask for more information. In the latter case, the 
computer selected a new pair of dimensions, and so on. When the subjects had requested 
seven dimensions for the given choice pair, they were only asked either to make a choice 
or see the last dimension. All answers were given by two buttons. After seeing the last 
dimension the subjects had to choose one of the two games. Whenever subjects chose a 
game the procedure continued with a new pair of games. This was continued until each of 
the 28 pairs of dimensions had been offered to the subjects at least 20 times. 
For a given pair of games, the information already displayed remained visible until the 
subject chose one of the games. Consequendy, only pairs of those dimensions were offered 
which were not already displayed on the screen. Among these pairs of dimensions the 
computer always selected the pair which had been least often presented. If there was more 
than one pair with the same minimum number of former presentations, the computer 
selected one of these pairs at random. Since the number of presentable pairs becomes more 
and more restricted the more dimensions are already displayed for a given game pair, 
some dimension pairs had to be presented more than 20 (up to 30) times to some subjects 
who tended to request more than four dimensions per choice pair on average. 
By this procedure some alternatives* idosyncratic feature combinations were learned fast, so 
that some alternatives could be recognized after seeing a few features when they occurred 
again. Therefore, 'pseudo—alternatives' were interspersed which consisted of random 
combinations of the games' features. Each alternative in a pair was replaced by a pseudo 
with .3 probability. Thus, on the average only every second (.7x.7 = .49) choice pair 
consisted of two real games. 
After the choices the dimensions' importance evaluations were elicited by a magnitude 
estimation procedure. Subjects first rank ordered the eight dimensions. Then a value of 10 
was assigned to the least important dimension, and the subjects had to judge how much 
more important each other dimension was. 
The experiment lasted for about three hours with a coffee break after 1.5 hours. Half the 
subjects, i.e., 20, were paid 10 German marks per hour for participation and experienced 
no further consequences of their choices. The other half received no pay but were 
informed that, as all games occurred more then once, they would receive the game they 
chose most often. The games were worth between 40 German marks and 60 German 
marks. 
Results 
Fitting the choice axiom. The si—values were estimated from the pairwise dimensional 
selection data by maximum likelihood. The distributions of the probabilities of Pearson's 
X^ — values over subjects are shown in the last three rows of Table 3. The correspondence 
between the percentiles and their actual values suggests that the choice axiom provides a 
good description of the selection of information for choosing. 
Table 3 also suggests that in this experiment the fit of the choice axiom is higher for 
subjects with consequences than for those without. The difference is significant by a 
Mann-Whitney-U-Test (z = 2.29, p=.022). 
Importance judgments. The SJ—parameters derived by the choice axiom are usually 
considered to have ratio scale level, whereas magnitude estimates are assumed to have 
log-interval scale level (Krantz, Luce, Suppes & Tversky, 1971, pp. 164 — 166). If both 
si and WJ are measures of the same underlying importance continuum then the logarithms 
of the two scales should show a linear relation. Indeed, we found the product-moment 
correlations between log(si) and log(wj) generally higher than those between s{ and W J , 
between log(si) and W J , and between sj and log(wj). They were also higher than rank 
correlations. 
Figure 2: Plots of the log(si) - log(wj) - relation for four subjects from Experiment III. 
The last two rows of Table 5 reveal that in general the relations between the magnitude 
estimates of importance and the sj—parameters were much higher in this experiment than 
they were in the first two experiments. Figure 2 gives a few graphical examples of this 
relation. 
Discussion 
By the reanalyses of data from two experiments and by a third experiment we pursued two 
questions that emerged from studies on the CDC —model: 1.) How do people select 
dimensions for comparing multiattribute alternatives? 2.) What is the relation between the 
dimensional selection process and subjects* importance judgments of the dimensions? 
With respect to the first question, the results of the three studies appear unanimous. 
Dimensions were selected and processed in sequences that are well described 
probabilistically by Luce*s choice axiom. Although people do not use the same number or 
sequence of dimensions when choosing among different pairs of alternatives from the same 
field, the selection process may be described in orderly and simple ways probabilistically. 
This appears to be a robust finding in consideration of the differences in design and 
procedure of the three experiments. 
Additionally, Experiment III found an effect of consequences. Subjects expecting 
consequences for their choices acted more in accordance with the choice axiom than 
subjects choosing only hypothetically. We assume that the increased personal interest of the 
subjects with consequences resulted in more consistent behavior. However, we did not find 
a consequence effect in Experiment II. This may be due to the minor role of consequences 
in Experiment II as compared to Experiment III. In Experiment II subjects obtained a copy 
of a journal in addition to their payment, whereas in Experiment III subjects received a 
much more valuable game as their only payment. On the other hand, a comparison of the 
groups with and without consequences in Experiment II appears rather doubtful due to the 
inflated size of the fit probabilities. 
This latter problem of inflated probabilities is currently being addressed in an experiment 
in which higher numbers of selection sequences are elicited. 
With respect to the second question, how these internal importance measures are related to 
explicit judgments of importance, the results were less unanimous. Although all three 
experiments yielded positive relations for most subjects, only the third study provided 
relations of satisfactory magnitude. Thus, we have shown that a high agreeement between 
judgments and behavioral information processing can be obtained. 
In toto, there are three differences between the first two and the third experiment which 
may be responsible for the different results and deserve further consideration. 
First, instead of journals, board games were used as the choice topic of the third 
experiment. This explanation is not a very likely candidate, because our former studies on 
the CDC—model (e.g., Aschenbrenner et al., 1984; Schmalhofer, Aschenbrenner, & 
Albert, in prep.) showed that the given topics did not affect the experimental results. 
Secondly, importance judgments were elicited before the choices in the first two 
experiments whereas they were obtained after the choices in the third experiment. It 
appears plausible that during the occupation with the choice alternatives the subjects' may 
have modified their opinion about the importance of the dimensions in accordance with the 
experienced variation of the alternatives on these dimensions. However, our previous 
attempts to manipulate subjects* importance judgments by presenting them with 
systematically designed alternatives were not successful.3 
The third difference is one of scaling procedure. Seven—point rating scales were used to 
assess importance in the first two experiments, whereas magnitude estimation was used in 
the third experiment. Inspection of Figure 1 suggests that floor effects and the restricted 
number of categories of the rating scales may be responsible for part of the lack of 
agreement between selection sequences and importance ratings. In addition, the magnitude 
estimation procedure, as it was used here, elicited relative judgments, whereas the ratings 
were absolute judgments. Thus, the difference in scaling procedures appears to be the main 
reason for the differences in the association between importance judgments and SJ—values. 
Although the questions investigated in this paper were originally derived from studies of 
the CDC —model, we consider the results to be of more general importance. Luce's choice 
axiom may be considered one of the fundamental principles in mathematical psychology. 
Thus, after its rejection as a general law of multidimensional choice, its role in a 
subprocess of the choice process is noteworthy. Additionally, the results show that the 
parameters derived by the choice axiom may have psychological significance. Further, 
importance judgments play a significant role in a variety of other fields, for instance, in 
decision aiding procedures. However, their reliability and validity is still discussed (e.g., 
Schoemaker & Waid, 1982; Stillwell, Seaver & Edwards, 1981). According to our results, 
observing information processing appears to be a promising method for validating 
importance judgments. Finally, the relevance of the results to any theory of choice 
behavior which assumes sequential information processing (Payne, 1982) is obvious. 
3) One of us (Aschenbrenner) conducted a number of unpublished experiments in which subjects had to 
evaluate dimensional importance (by ranking and mgnitude estimation) before and after making choices. 
Choice alternatives were adaptively designed to show highly restricted variation on some dimensions (for 
instance, the most or an intermediately important dimension of a subject) as compared to other dimensions. 
Surprisingly, these experiments found hardly any and no systematic differences between the importance 
judgments made before and after the choice tasks. 
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